Introduction
Consider a two-person zero-sum stochastic game with countable state space S, finite action sets A and B for players 1 and 2, respectively, and law of motion p. The history space H ∞ consists of all plays h = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .) = ((a 1 , b 1 , z 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 , z 2 ), . . .).
Thus H ∞ = (A × B × S) × (A × B × S) × . . . .
Let f be a bounded Borel-measurable function defined on H ∞ , where the sets A, B, and S are given the discrete topology and H ∞ is given the product topology. The stochastic game S(f )(z) begins at state z ∈ S, player 1 chooses a strategy σ, player 2 chooses a strategy τ , and then 2 pays 1 the expected value of f , namely E z,σ,τ f .
Theorem 1 (Martin [5] ) The game S(f )(z) has a value.
Our object in this chapter is to sketch Martin's proof of this remarkable theorem.
Martin entitled his paper "The determinacy of Blackwell games" and explained how Blackwell [1] , [2] formulated the general question and solved the special case of G δ games. Blackwell also conjectured that all Borel games would have a value, as Martin has now confirmed.
Theorem 1 is a vast generalization of the theorem on lim sup games in the previous chapter. However, the proof that lim sup games have a value also provided an algorithm for calculating it. The proof of Theorem 1 below does not reveal how the value of S(f )(z) can be found. Also, it will be shown in Section 6 that the more general Borel games can, in a sense, be approximated by lim sup games.
Games of Perfect Information
The proof of Theorem 1 depends on another celebrated theorem of Martin [4] on games of perfect information. We first recall how these games are played.
Let the action sets A and B for players 1 and 2, respectively, be completely arbitrary nonempty sets. The players alternate turns and do not randomize. Thus player 1 chooses a 1 ; then, knowing a 1 , player 2 chooses b 1 . For n ≥ 2, player 1, knowing a 1 , b 1 , . . . , b n−1 , chooses a n , and then player 2, knowing a 1 , b 1 , . . . , b n−1 , a n , chooses b n . The choices of the players at each stage may be restricted to nonempty subsets of their respective action sets that depend on the actions played up to that point. There is a distinguished subset W of the product space of possible plays (A × B) N 
The Games G(v, z)
We will now define a family of perfect information games G(v, z) for 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, z ∈ S that are associated with the stochastic game S(f )(z). An analysis of these games will allow us to deduce Theorem 1 from Theorem 2.
As a first step, define X = A × B × S and let φ be a bounded function defined on X. Here is a slight variant of the one-day game of the previous chapter.
The one-day game A(φ)(z): 1 chooses a 1 ∈ A, 2 chooses b 1 ∈ B, the next state z 1 has distribution p(·|z, a 1 , b 1 ), and 2 pays 1 the expected value of φ(a 1 , b 1 , z 1 ). Let (Gφ)(z) be the value of A(φ)(z).
Assume from now on, without loss of generality, that the payoff function f takes values in the unit interval [0,1].
The perfect information game
and so forth. Player 1 wins the game if
Several remarks are in order:
1. It is straightforward to check that the winning set for player 1 is Borel. Thus Theorem 2 applies to show that one of the players has a winning strategy. 2. Player 1 has a legal move at each stage of play, e.g., φ n ≡ 1. 3. In order to win the game, player 1 would like to choose the functions φ n "small," but the rules require player 1 to choose them sufficiently "large." This creates tension in the game. 4. If player 1 has a winning play in the game G(v, z) and 0 ≤ v ≤ v, then the same play will win the game G(v , z).
Defineṽ to be the supremum of the set of all v ∈ [0, 1] such that player 1 has a winning strategy in G(v, z). It follows from the last remark that player 1 has a win for all v ∈ [0,ṽ) and, by Theorem 2, player 2 has a winning strategy for all v ∈ (ṽ, 1]. It turns out that the value of the stochastic game S(f )(z) isṽ, as will follow from two lemmas. Let V (z) and V(z) be the upper and lower values of the game S(f )(z), respectively.
Lemma 1 If player 1 has a winning strategy for
G(v, z), then V(z) ≥ v. Hence, V(z) ≥ṽ.
Lemma 2 If player 2 has a winning strategy for
Theorem 1 is immediate from the two lemmas. The next two sections are devoted to their proofs.
The Proof of Lemma 1
Let φ 0 , φ 1 , . . . be a winning strategy for player 1 in G(v, z). (Note: Player 1's nth move φ n will, in general, depend on the first n moves x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n of player 2, but we will usually suppress this dependence to simplify notation.) We will define a strategy σ = (σ 0 , σ 1 , . . .) for player 1 in the stochastic game S(f )(z) such that E z,σ,τ f ≥ v for all strategies τ for player 2 in S(f )(z). This is sufficient.
Let σ 0 be optimal for player 1 in the one-day game A(φ 0 )(z); thus
for all probability measures ν on B. For n ≥ 1, let σ n = σ n ( x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) be optimal for 1 in A(φ n )(z n ); thus
Now fix a strategy τ for player 2 in S(f )(z) and write E for the expectation operator E z,σ,τ . Define random variables
Then, for n ≥ 0,
and we see that {Y n } is a bounded submartingale. Hence,
because {φ n } is a winning strategy for 1 in G(v, z). Thus Ef ≥ v, and the proof of Lemma 1 is complete.
The Proof of Lemma 2
Let τ * be a winning play for player 2 in G(v, z) and let δ > 0. We will construct a strategy τ for player 2 in the stochastic game S(f )(z) such that E z,σ,τ f ≤ v + δ for all strategies σ for player 1 in S(f )(z). This will be sufficient. Our definition of τ uses a kind of "best response" ψ n to τ * in G(v, z). The ψ n will be chosen to be as small as possible at each stage, but every response is ultimately futile against the winning play τ * . Also, the ψ n can fail to be legal, and we will also need to approximate ψ n by a legal strategy φ * n . Finally, the proof will use the notion of a partial history p n = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) that is "consistent" with τ * . The ψ n , φ * n , and the notion of "consistency" will all be defined inductively on n.
Call p 1 = (x 1 ) consistent (with τ * ) if there exists a legal first move φ 0 for player 1 in G(v, z) such that player 2 (using τ * ) plays x 1 in response. For (x 1 ) consistent, let
where the infimum is taken over all such φ 0 , and choose one of them
is an approximate best (i.e., smallest) legal response when x 1 is consistent. For x 1 inconsistent, the choice is less critical and we set ψ 0 (x 1 ) = φ * 0 (x 1 ) = 1.
So φ is a legal first move for player 1 in G(v, z) . Let x * be the response of player 2 using τ * . If φ(x * ) = 0, then 1 can play φ n = 0, for all n and win G(v, z) -contradicting the assumption that τ * is a winning play for 2. The other possibility is that φ(x * ) = ψ 0 (x * ) − < ψ 0 (x * ), which contradicts the definition of ψ 0 . This proves the claim. Now assume that p n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is consistent and that
if there exists a move φ n for player 1 in G(v, z) such that player 2 (using τ * ) plays x n+1 in response to
For p n+1 consistent, define
where the infimum is over all such φ n , and choose one of them
Proof. Similar to that of Claim 1. We are finally ready to define the strategy τ for player 2 in the stochastic game S(f )(z). Let τ 0 be optimal for player 2 in the one-day game A(ψ 0 )(z) and, for every partial history p n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), let τ n (p n ) be optimal for 2 in A(ψ n (p n ))(z n ), where x n = (a n , b n , z n ). Now fix a strategy σ for player 1 in S(f )(z) and write E for E z,σ,τ .
Define random variables
where the first inequality is by definition of τ n and the second is a consequence of the claims and the definition of φ * n−1 on inconsistent partial histories p n = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Hence,
and so
By the Fatou inequality,
But the strategy τ * is a winning strategy for 2 in G(v, z); so
Thus Ef ≤ v + δ and the proof is complete.
An Approximation Theorem
For a function u with domain the set of all finite sequences (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of elements of X, define functions u * and u * on each history h = (
Let V (f )(z) be the value of the stochastic game S(f )(z) for f a bounded Borel-measurable function as in Theorem 1.
Proof. For the first equality, let v < V (f )(z) and define
where φ n−1 and Y n are as in the proof of Lemma 1. Then u * ≤ f and V (u * ) ≥ v. The second equality follows from the first by considering −f .
A Generalization and a Question
Theorem 1 can be extended to arbitrary sets S, A, and B in the framework of finitely additive probability theory [3] . Indeed, the same proof goes through with only minor changes.
It is an open question whether the theorem can be generalized to a Borel-measurable setting like that of Nowak [6] in which S, A, B are Borel subsets of Polish spaces with some additional requirements of compactness and continuity. A serious technical difficulty arises in the proof because now the strategies in the stochastic game must be measurable. But since good strategies in the stochastic game are constructed from winning strategies in the game of perfect information, their measurability depends on the existence of measurable winning strategies in the game of perfect information. We do not know whether or not measurable winning strategies always exist for the game of perfect information in a Borel setting.
